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CURRENT CASES
BREACH OF CONTRACT AND FRAUD: COMPUTER
SALES DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENT - Computer Sys-
tems Engineering, Inc. v. Qantel Corp. 740 F.2d 59 (1st Cir. 1984).
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has upheld a judg-
ment against a manufacturer of business computers for breach of
contract, fraud and violation of Massachusetts consumer protection
law, based upon a distributorship agreement and representations re-
lating thereto. The judgment appears to extend contract and tort
protections in computer sales cases to a more sophisticated class of
plaintiff-buyers.
In Computer Systems Engineering, the defendant, Qantel Cor-
poration (Qantel), a manufacturer of small business computers
based in California, entered into a written distributorship agreement
granting the plaintiff, Computer Systems Engineering, Inc., a Mas-
sachusetts computer distributor, (CSE), an exclusive territory in the
Boston area for sale of Qantel's computer systems. In its complaint,
CSE alleged that under the distributorship agreement it was to be
the distributor of both Qantel's system hardware and a software
package called SOLUTIONS. More particularly, CSE alleged that
Qantel had obligated itself to and represented that it would provide
a "turnkey" ' software package called SOLUTIONS for CSE to sell
with the hardware. Qantel denied making such a representation or
assuming such an obligation. It claimed that its only obligation was
to furnish the hardware.
After the admission of parol evidence, both the judge and the
jury at the federal district court level found that Qantel had assured
CSE during the relevant period that Qantel would provide turnkey
software and that the SOLUTIONS software was nearly market
ready, needing only minor corrections to work the "bugs" out. The
judge and jury also found that the software package was not ready
to be sold to end users without substantial modification and was
nowhere near a stage of readiness such that- it could be called turn-
1. Software packages generally require some modification for a particular user. A
"turnkey" system is one that is easily adapted for various uses, requiring a minimum amount
of reprogramming to be modified for a particular user. It can be used almost "straight off the
shelf."
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key.2 The jury found that Qantel had breached its distributorship
contract with CSE and that Qantel's fraudulent representations in-
duced CSE to enter the original contract (or a subsequent extension
thereof) to its detriment. The district court judge ruled that Qantel
had made false and material representations to CSE with reckless
disregard for their truth or falsity so as to violate Massachusetts
General Law chapter 93A, Section 2.3
On appeal, Qantel challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the judgments in favor of CSE on the breach of contract,
fraud and chapter 93A claims. The findings of the federal district
court were upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals on all causes of
action.4
Qantel alleged on appeal that the contract was a fully inte-
grated agreement that expressly excluded any responsibility for pro-
viding a software package. It therefore argued that CSE's parol
evidence on the interpretation of certain contract provisions5 should
not have been admitted. The court of appeals rejected Qantel's ar-
guments in that Qantel had never made the proper objections at the
trial court level. Although Qantel was not required to "pepper the
record" with objections every time parol evidence was introduced,
the court of appeals held that Qantel was obligated to make known
to the trial court its positions concerning the parol evidence rule.6
With regard to the fraud and chapter 93A causes of action,
Qantel argued on appeal that CSE could not justifiably rely on the
alleged misrepresentations7 concerning the SOLUTIONS software
2. 740 F.2d at 63.
3. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (West 1984). The statute, in pertinent part,
reads as follows: "(a) Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful."
4. 740 F.2d at 63. A variety of other issues raised on appeal are not discussed in this
note. They include the sufficiency of evidence to support an award of lost profits; choice of
law questions; the right to a new trial based on improper closing arguments, the false testi-
mony and submission of a punitive damages issue to the jury when punitive damages are not
allowed in Massachusetts on common law fraud claims; and the availability of pre-judgment
interest.
5. In paragraph 3(f) of the original distributorship agreement, Qantel agreed to "pro-
vide marketing direction and guidance as required." CSE's position was that this provision
required Qantel to furnish CSE with a software package that was turnkey. CSE supported its
interpretation of paragraph 3(f) with parol evidence, including representations by Qantel
during negotiations that it would provide turnkey software, brochures supplied by Qantel to
give to end-users which claimed that SOLUTIONS was turnkey, and assurances by Qantel
that SOLUTIONS would soon be fixed.
6. 740 F.2d at 64.
7. See C.M. Walker, Computer Litigation and the Manufacturer's Defenses Against
Fraud, 1 COMPUTER LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1982-1983 255, 265-268. A common defense to
any fraud claim attacks the element of reliance by asserting that the plaintiff's own sophistica-
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and that CSE had waived any right to recover for fraud because it
renewed the distributorship agreement nearly 16 months after the
original agreement was executed, with full knowledge of any mis-
representations. The court of appeals rejected these arguments not-
ing that the district court had expressly found that Qantel had
failed to prove that CSE knew, or reasonably should have known,
on or before the date the extension agreement was executed, that
Qantel's representations were fraudulent. The record showed that
Qantel had repeatedly assured CSE that the few "bugs" in the
software would soon be fixed and that a turnkey system as described
in Qantel brochures was just around the corner.' As such, the court
of appeals found more than sufficient evidence to support the find-
ing of the district court.
With regard to the Massachusetts consumer protection statute
chapter 93A claim, Qantel alleged on appeal that the evidence was
insufficient, first, to justify the lower court's finding of unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices in the conduct of its trade9 and, second, to
satisfy the requisite "willful or knowing violation" of chapter 93A,
section 1110 necessary to award double or treble damages. In es-
sence, the district court had held that a finding of common law
fraud furnished a basis for liability under Chapter 93A.11 In addi-
tion, the district court held that the willful or knowing elements
were proven by showing that Qantel committed a knowing fraud -
knowing that the fact they represented to be true was not true, or at
least that they did not know if it were true. The court of appeals
adopted the district court judge's opinion regarding these issues, af-
tion and investigation (or lack of knowledge due to a breach of its duty to investigate) pre-
cludes justifiable reliance on the defendant's representations. For example, in APLications
Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F.Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the trial court found that the
plaintiff could not rely on the defendant's representations due to its own sophistication and
knowledge regarding computer technology.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 541 (1977) provides that parties cannot blindly
enter deals relying on the representations of others; parties must use their senses to detect
obviously false representations. Further, there can be no reliance if representations are
known to be false. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 540 (1977), in support of CSE,
provides that there is no duty to investigate regarding intentional fraud/misrepresentations.
8. 740 F.2d at 65-66.
9. See supra note 3.
10. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 93A, § 11 (West 1984). The statute, in pertinent
part, provides that a plaintiff's total recovery under chapter 93A, Section 2 may be up to
three and not less than two times the amount of actual damages "if the court finds that the
.. .(defendant's) act or practice was a willful or knowing violation of said section 2."
11. 571 F. Supp. 1365, 1372. See also Levings v. Forbes & Wallace Inc.,8 Mass. App.
Ct. 498, 504, 396 N.E.2d 149, 154 (1979); and Evans v. Yegen Associates, Inc., 556 F. Supp.
1219 (D.C. 1982) (acts of fraud clearly fall under chapter 93A).
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firming both the finding of a chapter 93A violation and the award of
double damages.
Computer Systems Engineering evidences an affirmance and a
new application of a growing trend in high technology litigation by
finding and upholding both breach of contract and computer sales
fraud in a distributorship agreement context. Quite often computer
sales contracts contain provisions exculpating the manufacturer
from or limiting the manufacturer's liability in situations where the
product does not live up to the buyer's expectations. Where the
agreement is made between a large computer manufacturer and a
relatively unsophisticated user-buyer, courts have begun to consider
the issue as to whether such exculpation clauses are unconsciona-
ble.12 The rationale for such concern is thatthe small businessman
as buyer has no idea what computers need or will do beyond what
the manufacturer tells them.
In Computer Systems Engineering, however, the buyer was a
computer sales outfit, presumably a great deal more sophisticated
than the average business user. As Qantel apparently alleged, CSE
probably knew what components were necessary for a successful
computer package. Yet the distributorship agreement did not spe-
cifically provide that the turnkey software was part of the con-
tract,13 and the buyer, CSE, was forced to resort to parol evidence
to show that aspect of the agreement. In the face of Qantel's allega-
tions that the contract was integrated and that the contract limited
Qantel's responsibility to provide the SOLUTIONS software, the
court of appeals found for CSE. Just as courts in the past have
assisted unsophisticated buyers and end-users by questioning the
enforceability of contract exculpation clauses, here the court of ap-
peals has extended that assistance to a sophisticated distributor to
overcome contract limitations by allowing parol evidence to inter-
pret provisions in the agreement.
Dissatisfied buyers of computer products have often overcome
express contract limitations by suing in tort for fraud rather than on
the contract.14 As relevant to Computer Systems Engineering, Mas-
sachusetts common law fraud requires a showing that the defendant
made a false representation of material fact with knowledge of the
falsity (or its equivalent), for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to
12. See Marzouk, Porter, and Rinkerrnan, Unconscionability in Computer Contracts
with Small Businesses, I COMPUTER LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1982-1983 11.
13. 740 F.2d at 64. Qantel argued that "its distributorship contract with CSE was a
fully integrated agreement that expressly excluded any responsibility from providing a
software package."
14. See C.M. Walker, supra, note 7, at 255.
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act thereon, and that the plaintiff relied upon the representation as
true and acted upon it to his detriment."5 Commonly, as in this
case, the defendant seller will attack the reliance element of the
fraud claim. As suggested above, it is easy to see how a smaller
business or individual user can justify reliance on the manufac-
turer's representations. But in Computer Systems Engineering, the
buyer itself is allegedly a sophisticated seller of computers. 16 Nev-
ertheless, the court of appeals extended the availability of a com-
puter sales fraud claim in this case to a sophisticated distributor17
by finding that Qantel failed to prove that CSE knew or should have
known that Qantel's representations were fraudulent.
As a guide to future practice, Computer Systems Engineering
provides a number of important lessons. Firstly, all parties to a
computer sales contract or distributorship agreement need to make
expressly clear in the written contract which products and services
are covered and which are not. CSE could have decreased its risk 18
by making clear that the turnkey software was included and a part
of the contract. Secondly, even sophisticated buyers may justifiably
rely on seller representations. The duty to investigate is limited in
intentional fraud cases, and caveat emptor is inapplicable. Lastly,
many jurisdictions may have consumer protection statutes similar
to Mass. Gen. Law chapter 93A. These laws can be extremely use-
ful where intentional fraud cannot be proven and/or the contract
contains express limitations which are damaging. Awareness of the
elements and the availability of these alternative causes of action, as
well as the possibility of recovering double or treble damages, may
well prove valuable to representation of computer clients.
Bradley J. Elkin
15. Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 322 N.E.2d 768 (1975). General
common law fraud outside Massachusetts parallels the Massachusetts rule. See W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS, § 105 (4th ed. 1977).
16. Qantel made just such a claim, challenging the finding that CSEjustifiably relied on
Qantel's representations.
17. For a discussion on reliance by unsophisticated and sophisticated buyers, see C.M.
Walker, supra, note 7, at 265-66.
18. CSE was fortunate on the breach of contract claim because one proper objection
under the parol evidence rule by Qantel probably would have led to the rejection of CSE's
parol evidence. Without the parol evidence, the contract stated that Qantel had no responsi-
bility to supply software, and CSE's evidence may not have been admitted to alter the con-
tract terms.
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COPYRIGHT LAW: SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE; Video-
tronics, Inc. v. Bend Electronics, 586 F. Supp. 478 (D.C.Nev. 1984)
The District Court for Nevada refused to issue a preliminary
injunction enjoining copyright infringement of a computer game
program because the copyright notice did not substantially comply
with the notice provisions of the United States Copyright Act. The
injunction was refused despite the fact that the defendants' were
wholly aware of the existence of the plaintiff's copyright claim.
The Videotronics case arose out of allegations by the plaintiff,
manufacturer of computer "Joker Poker" and "Keno Keypad"
games, that defendant, Bend Electronics, had failed to pay the
plaintiff according to a distribution contract and had copied plain-
tiff's "Joker Poker" computer program without its permission.'
The court initially considered whether the copyright notice
was valid under 17 U.S.C. section 401. The game contained a copy-
right notice that was technically valid, but was displayed only ran-
domly.2 Defendants alleged that this notice appeared too
infrequently to be valid. Under section 401, notice must be affixed
to the work in such a manner and location so as to give reasonable
notice of the claim of copyright.3 Reasonableness of the notice de-
pends upon its being "permanently legible to an ordinary user of the
work under normal conditions of use."'4 As applied to books, for
example, copyright notice can be placed on the title page, the last
page of the main body of the book, or on either side of the back
cover of the book.' However, random placement of the notice is
not permitted. As applied to works which cannot be seen without
the aid of a machine - for example video games and computer
programs - there are only two permissible methods of displaying a
notice: (1) notice that is displayed at the user's terminal at sign on;
or (2) notice that is continuosly displayed on the terminal.'
Applying these rules, the district court concluded that the
"Joker Poker" copyright notice did not meet the requirement of
permanent legibility to "an ordinary user of the work under normal
1. 586 F. Supp. at 480.
2. Id. The notice was programmed to appear about once in every five to ten games.
Additionally, the notice would appear if the reset button was pushed.
3. 17 U.S.C.A. § 401(c) (West 1976).
4. 37 C.F.R. § 201.20(c) (1982).
5. 37 C.F.R. § 201.20(d)(1), -(8).
6. 37 C.F.R. § 201.20(g).
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conditions of use."' The court stated that the notice would be ac-
ceptable if it appeared at the beginning of each game.' The court
further took notice of the fact that the continuous display of a no-
tice is technologically feasible.9
Although a copyright notice may be inadequate for purposes of
section 401, section 405 of the Copyright Act provides that a copy-
right will not be invalidated if: (1) the notice has been omitted from
no more than a relatively small number of copies; or (2) registration
for the work has been made before or is made within five years after
the publication without notice, and a reasonable effort is made to
add notice to all copies. °
In its analysis of section 405, the court stated that Congress
intended to avoid arbitrary and unjust forfeitures resulting from un-
intentional or relatively unimportant omissions and errors in the
copyright notice." To achieve this goal Congress chose to excuse
the existence of a relatively small number of copies that lack notice,
and to allow the copyright owner to make efforts to correct his
copyright notice defects. However, in applying their analysis to the
facts at hand, the Videotronics court found not only that more than
a relatively small number of the computer programs lacked the
proper notice,1 2 but also that the plaintiff's had failed to make a
reasonable effort to add an effective notice to the computer
program. 13
The court interpreted "reasonable effort" to implicitly include
the expectation that time and money will be expended over and
above that required in the normal course of business. 4 The evi-
dence however showed that the plaintiff had made no effort to in-
corporate a correct notice in the "Joker Poker" games.' The court
thus concluded that the plaintiff had failed to act sufficiently within
the spirit of the "reasonable effort" requirement of section 405.16
7. 586 F. Supp. at 482.
8. Id. at 482 n.8.
9. Id. at 482 n.7. The court noted that the notice in "Keno Keypad", another game
manufactured by plaintiff, appeared continuously. The court also recognized that only a few
people had access to the reset button. Since the notice was effectively concealed, the court
ruled it inadequate.
10. 17 U.S.C.A. § 405(a) (West 1976).
11. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 143 (1976).
12. There were approximately 300 copies of "Joker Poker" that lacked adequate notice.
13. 586 F. Supp. at 482.
14. Id. The court also recognized that there are limitations on the "reasonable effort"
requirement. The copyright owner for example need not recall all the works which have been
distributed to the public and lack proper notice.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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The Videotronics court finally addressed the question of
whether the plaintiff was entitled to copyright protection, although
their copyright notice was invalid, because the defendants were
wholly aware of Videotronic's claim of copyright ownership. The
court determined that to be so entitled one must first "substantially
comply with the notice requirements of the copyright law."17 To
grant copyright protection without such "substantial compliance"
would be to frustrate the primary purpose of the Copyright Act,
which is to inform the public of the copyright and warn against
republication." While a mere technical deviation may still serve
the statutory purpose, the notice contained in Videotronics' com-
puter games could not be readily seen by the public. Therfore, the
court found that it failed to substantially comply with the statute,
and although the infringers clearly were aware of plaintiff's claim of
copyright protection, the plaintiff was not entitled to such
protection. 19
This interpretation of the notice requirements of the Copyright
Act requires that any copyright notice substantially comply to those
requirements. This court has made it clear that whether or not a
defendant knows or should know that the plaintiff owns a copyright
in the work, that defendant will not be held liable for infringement
when the copyright notice contained in the program is defective.
Computer program developers will have to make a more diligent
effort towards creating a copyright notice which conforms to these
rules, or else risk the chance that their notice is defective, and their
programs unprotected.
The notice would have to appear at either the beginning or the
end of each game. To program the notice to appear less frequently
would risk the loss of copyright protection. Furthermore, if a man-
ufacturer has already placed programs on the market without
proper notice, it is unclear whether such games can be protected.
The Videotronics court refused to address the issue of whether a
manufacturer may be entitled to protection if it later affixes a proper
notice.20 The court's interpretation of reasonable effort requires the
manufacturer to expend some time and money to insure compliance
with the copyright law. However, as the court recognizes, recalling
large numbers of computer programs may be futile.2 There re-
17. See Uneeda Doll Co. v. Goldfarb Novelty Co., 373 F.2d 851, 853, 854 (2d Cir.
1967).
18. 586 F. Supp. at 484.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 484 n.14.
21. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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mains a conflict between the court's interpretation of "reasonable
effort" and its refusal to rule on whether adding an adequate notice
would entitle the manufacturer to protection.
Joseph P. Tabrisky
